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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The headline in the local newspaper exemplifies the state of the 
nation’s economy: “Safire Mountain community devastated by the 
announcement that its largest employer, DeShai Manufacturing, will lay 
off over one-third of its workforce.”  DeShai Manufacturing’s (DeShai)1 
operations, located in the small backcountry community of Safire 
Mountain,2 have been a staple of the community’s economy for over 
seventy-five years.  Not only is DeShai the largest employer in the 
community, it also pays the highest wages of any company within a one 
hundred mile radius.  For that reason, DeShai employs the breadwinner 
of nearly every household in the Safire Mountain community.  Safire 
Mountain is a close-knit community consisting of approximately six 
small country towns, all located within approximately fifty miles of 
DeShai, with a combined population of approximately fifteen thousand. 
It is no secret that the nation’s economy has been hit hard by the 
fallout of the dot com failures, corporate scandals, and terrorist attacks.  
In this economy, mass layoffs have become commonplace as companies 
strive to keep respectable bottom lines or, worse yet, to stay out of 
bankruptcy.  DeShai, not immune from the effects of an economic 
downturn, is struggling itself.  Notably, the health of the economy on 
both national and community levels depends on the ability of pivotal 
companies like DeShai to stay afloat in these turbulent times.  With 
these concerns in mind, a new, aggressive chief executive officer (CEO) 
has been brought in to secure the future of DeShai.  The end of the fiscal 
year is looming and the CEO will be giving an all-important pitch to 
potential investors next month using the year-end numbers and profit 
projections for the coming fiscal year.  However, the CEO is concerned 
that DeShai’s profit margin is not sufficient to secure the much-needed 
financing required for the desired growth of the company.  Seeking a 
 
 1. DeShai Manufacturing is a fictional company. 
 2. Safire Mountain is a fictional community. 
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quick fix for the company’s bottom line, the CEO meets with the Vice 
President of Human Resources (VP HR) and directs her to reduce 
payroll overhead going into the next fiscal year by implementing an 
immediate reduction in force (RIF).3  The VP HR’s marching orders are 
to reduce the current workforce of one thousand workers by one-third 
within the next two weeks. 
The VP HR knows a large RIF at DeShai will have a far-reaching 
impact in the Safire Mountain community.  The economy of Safire 
Mountain is completely dependent upon the ongoing success of DeShai, 
and any economic distress felt by DeShai will have a ripple effect on the 
Safire Mountain economy and, ultimately, on the national economy.  
The retail, services, and restaurant businesses within the community are 
dependent upon DeShai to supply customers.  What starts as a ripple will 
swell into a tidal wave as DeShai workers become unemployed and stop 
spending money and patronizing businesses within the community, 
leading to the demise of Safire Mountain’s fragile economy.  The effects 
do not stop there; the RIF wave will impact the state and national 
economies as well.  The state’s economy will be impacted as a flood of 
unemployment claims and state assistance claims are filed.  Likewise, an 
increase in demand for federal assistance will adversely impact the 
nation’s overall economy. 
In addition to the business and human aspects of conducting a large 
RIF, the VP HR must also analyze the RIF’s legal implications.  The 
pain in the VP HR’s stomach intensifies when she discovers that this 
will not be an ordinary layoff; she is contemplating a RIF that may 
trigger requirements under the Federal Worker Adjustment and 
 
 3. DeShai is not alone in its decision to conduct a RIF.  In fact, many of 
America’s mega-companies, such as Kmart, Sprint PCS, Boeing (and related entities), 
United Airlines, and Xerox, to name a few companies doing business in California, opted 
to conduct mass layoffs in 2002.  Employment Development Department, Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act Notices, at http://www.edd.ca.gov/ 
eddwarncn02.pdf  (last visited Feb. 3, 2003).  In 2002, the number of employees in 
California laid off by these companies is as follows: Kmart—1654; Sprint PCS—1180; 
Boeing—3629 (plus an additional 43 in January 2003); United Airlines—801 (plus an 
additional 612 in January 2003); Xerox—335.  Id.  This information only pertains to 
mass layoffs and plant closures affecting employees in California that triggered Federal 
Worker Adjustment Retraining and Notification Act obligations.  The U.S. Department 
of Labor (DOL) reports that between January 2002 and May 2002 there were 8222 mass 
layoffs resulting in 910,009 claims for unemployment insurance benefits.  Mass Layoffs 
in May 2002, NEWS: U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Bureau of Labor Statistics), June 27, 2002, at 
1, at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/mmls_06272002.pdf.  This is an increase 
from 7434 mass layoffs and 880,347 claims during the same period in 2001.  Id. 
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Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act or Act).4  The mere utterance 
of the words “WARN Act” is enough to send shivers up the spine of any 
human resources professional. 
Recognizing the dramatic economic effects that a layoff can have on a 
community and its workers, Congress enacted the WARN Act to provide 
protection to workers, their families, and the communities in which they 
live in the event of a mass layoff or plant closing.5  The WARN Act 
mandates that employers who meet specific requirements provide to 
employees advance notice of planned mass layoffs or plant closings.6  
Conducting a layoff is never easy, but now that DeShai must comply 
with the WARN Act, the ordeal becomes even more difficult because the 
company’s discretion and flexibility in conducting the RIF is greatly 
hampered by its legal obligations under the Act.7 
 
 4. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109 
(2000).  The WARN Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to prescribe regulations 
necessary to implement and carry out the WARN Act.  Id. § 2107(a).  The WARN Act 
regulations, issued by the U.S. Department of Labor, are published in title 20 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations at part 639.  20 C.F.R. §§ 639.1–639.10 (2002).  As this 
Comment will explain, a WARN Act RIF is vastly more complicated to administer and 
may expose a company to more legal actions than a non-WARN Act RIF.  Absent state 
laws, collective bargaining, or policy obligations, an employer conducting a RIF that is 
not covered by the WARN Act has greater discretion with regard to how much notice to 
provide, what type of notice to give, who should receive notice, and how much 
severance, if any, to pay the laid off employees. 
 5. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1.  At the time the WARN Act was implemented in 1988, 
workers were all too familiar with the term “layoff.”  There was evidence that layoffs 
were having negative public health effects and that advance notice of layoffs would 
promote positive adjustment by workers.  Richard W. McHugh, Fair Warning or Foul? 
An Analysis of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act in 
Practice, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 5 & nn.13–14 (1993).  Regardless of the 
cause of the layoff, communities feel the effects through decreased revenues and states 
are impacted through increased unemployment levels.  These effects drew significant 
attention from Congress, and mandatory notice for plant closings and mass layoffs was 
presumed to be the answer.  See Christopher P. Yost, The Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification Act of 1988: Advance Notice Required?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 
675, 675–76 (1989).  The Safire Mountain community seems to be just the type of 
community the WARN Act was enacted to protect, given that its economy depends 
heavily on the health of a single employer. 
 6. 20 C.F.R. §§ 639.1–639.3.  The notice, in theory, is to provide workers with 
the time to find other employment or, if necessary, the time to obtain new skills or 
training in order to successfully compete in the job market.  Id. § 639.1(a). 
 7. It is worth noting that at least twenty-three states have implemented 
counterpart statutes to the WARN Act that require advance notice to laid off employees, 
and at least four states mandate severance pay in certain situations.  ETHAN LIPSIG & MARY 
C. DOLLARHIDE, DOWNSIZING: LAW AND PRACTICE 220 (Supp. 1999).  Presumably due to 
the current state of the economy, more states are becoming interested in adopting their 
own versions of the WARN Act.  California jumped on that bandwagon in September 
2002 when Governor Gray Davis signed Assembly Bill 2957.  See A.B. 2957, 2001–02 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).  On January 1, 2003, California’s mass layoff, relocation, 
and termination law went into effect.  CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1400–1408 (West 1989 & 
Supp. 2003).  California’s “Baby WARN,” as it has been dubbed, has a broader scope 
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This Comment examines the WARN Act from DeShai’s perspective  
as the company prepares to conduct a WARN Act RIF, providing a 
firsthand look at the real-world difficulties that DeShai experiences as it 
attempts to decipher the language of the WARN Act to determine the 
actions it must take to comply with the Act’s requirements.  The 
Comment focuses on how particular ambiguities in the statutory 
language of the WARN Act present for employers compliance problems 
that result in severe economic inefficiencies and discusses the 
disagreement among the circuit courts as to how such ambiguities should 
be resolved.  In an effort to make the WARN Act more user-friendly for 
employers, this Comment also proposes practical amendments that 
should be implemented immediately.  Specifically, Congress should amend 
the WARN Act in three ways: (1) by designating the remedy afforded to 
employees as a compensatory, make-whole remedy, (2) by including a 
definition of back pay that will serve to make an employee whole, and 
(3) by declaring that the calculation of back pay will be based on the 
number of working days that occur during the violation period.  These 
proposed amendments are not drastic.  Rather, they strike a proper 
balance between promoting the purpose of the WARN Act and 
providing statutory language that will serve to assist, rather than hinder, 
an employer in its WARN Act compliance. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE WARN ACT 
To fully understand the difficulties that DeShai faces upon discovering 
that its planned RIF is covered by the WARN Act, the Act and its 
requirements must first be examined.  The WARN Act requires that an 
“employer”8 planning a “plant closing”9 or “mass layoff”10 must provide 
 
and effect than the Federal WARN Act and compliance promises to be even more 
burdensome.  California Adopts Plant Closing Law, LAB. L. EXTRA (Cal. Chamber of 
Commerce), Oct. 17, 2002, at http://www.hrcalifornia.com/News_Services/Labor_Law_Extra/ 
View_Past_Issues/2002_Issues/October_17_2002/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2003).  A state 
counterpart statute may not necessarily be consistent with the Federal WARN Act, and 
an employer is legally obligated to comply with both state and federal law.  Sometimes a 
state counterpart statute may apply even if the WARN Act does not.  Therefore, 
employers must carefully review all applicable laws before conducting a layoff.  This, of 
course, serves to further complicate a RIF. 
 8. An employer must first determine whether it is covered by the WARN Act.  
Such a determination is based on the number of the employer’s employees.  A company 
that meets the WARN Act’s definition of “employer” is deemed a covered employer for 
purposes of the WARN Act.  The WARN Act defines an employer as “any business 
enterprise that employs (A) 100 or more employees, excluding part-time employees; or 
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the “affected employees”11 (or their representatives)12 with at least sixty 
days’ notice of the planned employment action.13  In addition to 
providing notice of the layoff to affected employees, an employer must 
also give notice to the state dislocated worker unit14 and the chief elected 
 
(B) 100 or more employees [including part-time employees] who in the aggregate work 
at least 4,000 hours per week (exclusive of hours of overtime).”  29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1); 
see also 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(1).  It is important to note that although part-time 
employees are not counted for purposes of determining whether a layoff constitutes a 
“mass layoff” under the WARN Act, such employees are entitled to receive WARN Act 
notice in the event of a mass layoff or plant closing.  20 C.F.R. § 639.6(b).  This is one of 
the few relatively clear areas of the WARN Act.  Yet, Arthur Anderson is currently 
being sued by two part-time employees who claim that the company failed to provide 
them with WARN Act notice when their employment was terminated in connection with 
a mass layoff on April 8, 2002.  Roquet v. Arthur Anderson L.L.P., 9 Lab. Rel. Rep. 
(BNA) (19 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas.) 670 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2002). 
 9. The WARN Act defines a “plant closing” as: 
the permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, or one or 
more facilities or operating units within a single site of employment, if the 
shutdown results in an employment loss at the single site of employment 
during any 30-day period for 50 or more employees excluding any part-time 
employees. 
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2); see also 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(b). 
 10. The WARN Act defines a “mass layoff” as: 
a reduction in force which (A) is not the result of a plant closing; and (B) 
results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-
day period for (i)(I) at least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any part-
time employees); and (II) at least 50 employees (excluding any part-time 
employees); or (ii) at least 500 employees (excluding any part-time 
employees). 
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3); see also 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(c). 
 11. The WARN Act defines “affected employees” as employees “who may 
reasonably be expected to experience an employment loss as a consequence of a 
proposed plant closing or mass layoff by their employer.”  29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5); see 
also 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(e).  In addition, any employee who reasonably may be bumped 
from his position by someone on the RIF list, due to bumping rights under the 
employer’s policy or under a collective bargaining agreement, is also covered as an 
affected employee.  See 20 C.F.R. §§ 639.3(e), 639.6(b).  Accordingly, employers must 
look beyond the RIF list to the workforce as a whole in determining which employees are 
entitled to notice under the WARN Act, which makes the RIF process further complicated. 
 12. For purposes of the WARN Act, an employee “representative” means “an 
exclusive representative of employees within the meaning of section 9(a) or 8(f) of the 
National Labor Relations Act or section 2 of the Railway Labor Act.”  20 C.F.R. § 
639.3(d).  For all practical purposes, a representative generally will be the affected 
employee’s collective bargaining agent or chief elected union official.  It is important to 
note that in some instances in which a collective bargaining agreement recognizes both 
the national and local entities of a union, the employer is required to provide notice to 
both the local and national union entities via their respective chief elected officers.  
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 16,058 (Apr. 20, 
1989) (providing supplementary information to the final WARN Act regulations). 
 13. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a). 
 14. Pursuant to title 3 of the Job Training Partnership Act, each state established or 
created a dislocated worker unit.  See 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(k).  Each state has published 
information on where an employer may serve WARN Act notice.  Usually this 
information can be obtained from a state’s official website.  See, e.g., Employment 
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official of the unit of local government15 where the plant closing or mass 
layoff will occur.16  DeShai has well over one hundred employees and, 
therefore, is a covered employer for purposes of the WARN Act.17  As a 
covered employer, DeShai must comply with the WARN Act in the 
event that any RIF triggers the Act’s provisions.  Because DeShai is 
planning to reduce its workforce by one-third18 and at least fifty 
employees will be affected, the RIF qualifies as a mass layoff that 
triggers DeShai’s obligation to comply with the WARN Act.19 
A.  WARN Act Notice 
To comply with the WARN Act, DeShai’s notice to its affected 
employees must contain certain specific information, as detailed in the 
WARN Act regulations.20  Along with notice to the affected employees, 
 
Development Department, Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act: 
How to Notify the State of a Plant Closing or Mass Layoff, at http://www.edd.ca.gov/ 
jtpawarntx.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2003).  For a state-by-state listing of dislocated 
worker units, see 9A Indiv. Empl. Rts. Manual (BNA) 595:911–16 (May 14, 2002). 
 15. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(2).  For purposes of the WARN Act, a “unit of local 
government” is “any general purpose political subdivision of a State which has the 
power to levy taxes and spend funds, as well as general corporate and police powers.”  
Id. § 2101(a)(7); see also 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(g).  In practice, the chief elected official of 
the unit of local government where the mass layoff or plant closing is conducted is 
usually the mayor.  However, it is probably best to contact the office of the local 
government to verify the appropriate official to receive notice.  If an employment site 
where a mass layoff or plant closing will take place is located in more than one unit of 
local government, the employer must give notice to the unit to which it paid the highest 
taxes in the preceding year.  See id. § 639.3(g). 
 16. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(2); see also 20 C.F.R. § 639.6. 
 17. See discussion supra note 8. 
 18. DeShai has 1000 employees.  Thus, a one-third reduction in force will result in 
334 employees losing their jobs. 
 19. See  discussion supra note 10. 
 20. See Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 
16,059 (Apr. 20, 1989) (providing supplementary information to the final WARN Act 
regulations).  WARN Act notice to affected employees must be written in language 
understandable to the employees and must set forth, at a minimum, the following 
information: (1) whether the employment action is expected to be permanent or 
temporary, and in the case of a plant closing, a statement that the entire plant will be 
closed, (2) the anticipated date of the mass layoff or plant closings and the anticipated 
separation date of the individual affected employee, (3) whether bumping rights exist, 
and (4) the name and telephone number of a company official who may be contacted to 
obtain further information.  An employer may also include in the notices any additional 
information that may be helpful to the affected employee.  20 C.F.R. § 639.7(d).  Such 
additional information may include information regarding dislocated worker assistance 
and, where the planned action is temporary, information as to the estimated duration of 
the planned action.  Id.  If an affected employee has a representative, the notice to the 
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DeShai must also provide separate WARN notices to the state dislocated 
worker unit and the local chief elected official.21 
After digesting the WARN Act requirements, the VP HR is alarmed to 
discover that DeShai’s obligations under the WARN Act conflict with 
the CEO’s demand for immediate reduction in payroll overhead.  In order 
to comply with the WARN Act, DeShai must give sixty days’ notice to 
employees selected for layoff.22  Therefore, the CEO’s deadline to reduce 
payroll overhead by the close of the fiscal year, which ends this month, 
cannot be met if DeShai is to comply with its legal obligations under the 
WARN Act.  Not wanting to give the CEO this bad news, the VP HR 
frantically scours the WARN Act in search of any loophole or 
exemption that will excuse DeShai of its legal obligations for compliance. 
B.  WARN Act Notice Exemptions 
Like many laws, the WARN Act provides for exemptions.  However, 
exemptions to the WARN Act are few in number and generally narrow 
in scope.23  There are two types of exemptions to the WARN Act: 
complete exemptions and partial exemptions.24 
 
representative must set forth (1) the name and address of the employment site where the 
mass layoff or plant closing will take place, (2) the name and telephone number of a 
company official who may be contacted to obtain further information, (3) whether the 
employment action is expected to be permanent or temporary and, in the case of a plant 
closing, a statement that the entire plant will be closed, (4) the date of the first employee 
separation and the anticipated schedule of employee separations, and (5) a listing of the job 
titles of the positions affected and the names of the workers in those jobs.  Id. § 639.7(c). 
 21. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a); 20 C.F.R. § 639.6.  The purpose behind requiring the 
company to send notice to the government is to allow the state dislocated worker unit to 
promptly provide the affected employee with assistance.  Id. § 639.1(a).  At a minimum, 
the government notices must include (1) the name and address of the employment site 
where the mass layoff or plant closing will take place, (2) the name and telephone number 
of a company official who may be contacted to obtain further information, (3) the 
anticipated date of the first employee separation, and (4) the number of affected employees.  
Id. § 639.7(f).  The regulations provide for an optional, lengthier notice that must include 
all of the information outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(f), plus information regarding (1) 
whether the employment action is expected to be permanent or temporary and, in the case 
of a plant closing, a statement that the entire plant will be closed, (2) the anticipated 
schedule of employee separations, (3) the job titles of the affected positions and the number 
of affected employees in each job classification, (4) whether bumping rights exist, and (5) 
the name of each union representing the affected employees and the name and address of 
the chief elected officer of each union.  Id. § 639.7(e).  However, as an alternative, 
employers may provide the abbreviated government notice detailed in 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(f), 
provided the additional information required by 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(e) is maintained by the 
employer and made available to the government upon request.  Id. § 639.7(f). 
 22. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a). 
 23. Washington v. Aircap Indus. Corp., 831 F. Supp. 1292, 1295–96 (D.S.C. 1993) 
(finding that the WARN Act must be construed broadly and its exceptions construed 
narrowly).  For statutory exemptions to the WARN Act, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 2102(b), 2103. 
 24. A complete analysis of these exemptions is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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1.  Complete Exemptions 
There are only two instances in which an employer is wholly exempt 
from complying with the WARN Act: (1) a situation in which the 
employer closes a temporary facility or conducts a plant closing or mass 
layoff due to completion of a project or undertaking,25 or (2) a situation 
in which the employer conducts a plant closing or mass layoff that 
constitutes a strike or lockout and that is not intended to evade WARN 
requirements.26  The rationale for these complete exemptions is 
grounded in whether the employee has a reasonable expectation of 
continuing employment.  In both complete exemption situations, the 
employee has no reasonable basis for an expectation of continued 
employment.27  Therefore, these are not situations for which the WARN 
Act was enacted to afford worker protection. 
Unfortunately for DeShai, the cost-cutting motives driving its RIF do 
not provide a complete exemption from the WARN Act.  The RIF is not 
the result of a temporary facility closure or project completion and does 
not arise out of a strike or lockout.  Thus, DeShai’s hopes for any relief 
from WARN Act compliance must be based on a partial exemption. 
2.  Partial Exemptions 
In addition to the complete exemptions, the WARN Act offers partial 
exemptions, provided certain requirements are met.  If an employer 
qualifies for one of the three partial exemptions, the employer may 
conduct a plant closing or mass layoff with a reduced notice period 
without incurring WARN Act liability.28  The first partial exemption is 
 
See generally Sandra J. Mullings, WARN: Judicial Treatment of Exemptions, Exclusions, 
and Excuses, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1209 (1997) (providing a detailed, although dated, 
analysis of these exemptions). 
 25. 29 U.S.C. § 2103(1).  No WARN Act notice will be required if the plant 
closing or mass layoff is due to the closing of a temporary facility or the completion of a 
temporary project and the affected employee clearly understood at the time of hire that 
the employment was temporary and limited to the duration of the project.  20 C.F.R. § 
639.5(c).  Allowing this exemption makes sense because when employees know their 
employment is temporary, they should not be surprised to find that they are suddenly 
without jobs.  In contrast, longer-term employees are more likely to be surprised if they 
suddenly lose their jobs.  Thus, the warning required by the WARN Act is more essential 
to the longer-term employees’ ability to prepare for the impending job loss. 
 26. 29 U.S.C. § 2103(2); see also 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(d). 
 27. See Mullings, supra note 24, at 1213–19. 
 28. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b). 
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the “faltering company” exemption.29  The faltering company exemption 
applies only to plant closings, not to mass layoffs, and the regulations 
provide that this exemption should be construed narrowly.30  DeShai is 
conducting a mass layoff, not a plant closing.  Therefore, because the 
faltering company exemption does not apply to mass layoffs, DeShai 
cannot avail itself of this partial exemption. 
The second partial exemption is the “unforeseen business circumstances” 
exemption.31  This exemption applies when “the closing or mass layoff 
is caused by business circumstances that were not reasonably 
foreseeable as of the time that notice would have been required.”32  A 
principal indicator that an event qualifies as an unforeseen business 
circumstance is whether the circumstance is caused by “some sudden, 
dramatic, and unexpected action or condition outside the employer’s 
control.”33  The unforeseen business circumstances exemption is interpreted 
more broadly than the faltering company exemption.34  However, 
DeShai’s goal in conducting the RIF is to make the company more 
attractive to potential investors.  Thus, the CEO’s plan to institute cost-
cutting measures cannot qualify as a “sudden, dramatic, and unexpected 
action or condition outside the employer’s control.”  Accordingly, 
DeShai cannot take advantage of the unforeseen business circumstances 
partial exemption. 
The third exemption is the “natural disaster” exemption.35  When a 
plant closing or mass layoff is the direct result of a natural disaster, such 
as a flood, earthquake, drought, or storm, no advance WARN Act notice 
 
 29. Id. § 2102(b)(1); see also 20 C.F.R. § 639.9. 
 30. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(a).  In order to invoke the faltering 
company exemption, an employer must satisfy a four-prong test establishing that at the 
time notice was to be given (1) the employer was actively seeking capital or business, (2) 
there was a realistic opportunity that the employer could secure the sought business or 
capital, (3) such capital or business, if obtained, would have allowed the employer to 
either avoid or postpone the closing, and (4) the employer reasonably believed in good 
faith that providing sixty days’ WARN Act notice would have precluded the company 
from securing the needed capital or business.  Id. 
 31. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b). 
 32. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(A). 
 33. 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b)(1).  Examples of situations in which the unforeseen 
business circumstances exemption may apply include “[a] principal client’s sudden and 
unexpected termination of a major contract with the employer, a strike at a major supplier 
of the employer, . . . an unanticipated and dramatic major economic downturn[,] . . . [and 
a] government ordered closing of an employment site.”  Id.  An employer is not expected 
to accurately predict the economic conditions that would affect demand for its products 
or services, but it must exercise the same commercially reasonable business judgment as 
would a similarly situated employer in the same market.  Id. § 639.9(b)(2). 
 34. See Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,042, 
16,061 (Apr. 20, 1989) (providing supplementary information to the final WARN Act 
regulations). 
 35. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(c). 
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is required.36  The Department of Labor has concluded that it may not be 
appropriate to narrowly construe the natural disaster exemption.37  
However, because DeShai’s RIF is not triggered by a natural disaster, 
this exemption does not apply. 
Assuming DeShai had been able to qualify for one of the three partial 
exemptions, DeShai would be required to provide “as much notice as is 
practicable” to the affected employees in order to avoid liability under 
the WARN Act.38  This notice requirement applies even in the case 
where notice can only be given after the RIF has taken place.39 
 
C.  Remedies for an Employer’s Violation 
 
When an employer violates the WARN Act by failing to give the 
required notice and does not qualify for an exemption, the company is 
liable to the aggrieved employees for (1) “back pay for each day of 
violation”40 and (2) benefits under any employee benefit plan,41 such as 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) health benefit 
plans.42  An employer’s liability for each may extend up to a maximum of 
 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(c)(1)–(2).  If an employer does 
not qualify for the natural disaster exemption because the closing or mass layoff was not 
a direct result of the natural disaster, the employer may qualify for the unforeseen 
business circumstances exemption.  Id. § 639.9(c)(4).  This is because the natural 
disaster could be construed as a “sudden, dramatic, and unexpected action or condition 
outside the employer’s control,” which is a requirement of the unforeseen business 
circumstances exception.  Id. § 639.9(b)(1).  Although advance WARN notice is not 
required when a plant closing or mass layoff is a direct result of a natural disaster, the 
employer must still provide some notice to the affected employees that the employment loss 
was caused by the natural disaster.  Such notice should include as much of the information 
required by 20 C.F.R. § 639.7 as is available to the employer.  Id. § 639.9(c)(3). 
 37. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification, 54 Fed. Reg., at 16,061. 
 38. 20 C.F.R. § 639.9. 
 39. Id.  When the employer provides reduced notice, the notice provided must 
include a statement of the reason for which reduced notice was given in addition to the 
notice elements delineated in 20 C.F.R. § 639.7.  29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(3); 20 C.F.R. § 639.9. 
 40. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)(A).  As discussed in Part V, infra, exactly what “back 
pay” and “each day of violation” mean are areas of contention between the circuit courts.  
However, this Comment proposes that back pay includes all pay and non-ERISA 
benefits the employee would have earned during the violation period had he continued to 
work, see infra Part V.A.2, and that “each day of violation” should be interpreted to 
mean back pay for each working day that the employer failed to provide notice.  See infra 
Part V.B.2. 
 41. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1). 
 42. Id. § 1002(1). 
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sixty days.43  However, an employer’s liability for a WARN Act violation 
shall be reduced by (1) any wages paid by the employer to the employee 
during the violation period, (2) any voluntary and unconditional payment 
to the employee by the employer that is not made pursuant to a legal 
obligation,44 and (3) any payment the employer makes to a third party “on 
behalf of and attributable to the employee for the period of the violation.”45 
In addition, an employer is liable to the government for civil penalties of 
up to $500 for each day of a WARN Act violation.46  However, the penalty 
does not apply if the employer pays each aggrieved employee the amount 
for which the employer is liable to the employee within three weeks after 
the closing or mass layoff.47  An employer’s liability to an aggrieved 
employee for a WARN Act violation may also be reduced if the 
employer is able to convince a court that the act or omission constituting the 
violation was made in good faith and that the employer had reasonable 
grounds to believe that the action taken was not a WARN Act violation.48 
The back pay, benefits, and civil penalties provided for by section 
2104 of the WARN Act are the exclusive remedies for an employer’s 
violation of the Act.49  This means that courts do not have the authority 
to issue injunctions to prevent plant closings or mass layoffs.50  
Although punitive damages for a violation of the WARN Act are not 
available,51 a court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the 
prevailing party in a WARN Act lawsuit.52 
 
 43. Id. § 2104(a)(1). 
 44. Severance payments made in exchange for an employee’s release of claims 
cannot be offset against an employer’s WARN Act liability because the payment is not 
unconditional.  See Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las 
Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 973 
(2001) (holding that Sands could not reduce its WARN Act liability by severance 
payments made to employees because the severance payments were conditioned on the 
employees’ agreement to continue working until a date certain).  Likewise, severance 
payments made pursuant to an established severance plan also are ineligible for offset 
because the employee is entitled to such payment regardless of whether proper WARN 
Act notice was provided.  See Tobin v. Ravenswood Aluminum Corp., 838 F. Supp. 262, 
273 n.17 (S.D.W. Va. 1993). 
 45. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(2)(A)–(C). 
 46. Id. § 2104(a)(3). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. § 2104(a)(4).  Application of this “good faith” exception is often litigated.  
See Ethan Lipsig & Keith R. Fentonmiller, A WARN Act Road Map, 11 LAB. LAW. 273, 
310 (1996). 
 49. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(b). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Finnan v. L.F. Rothschild & Co., 726 F. Supp. 460, 464–65 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (finding that the exclusive remedy provision of the WARN Act “unmistakably 
conveys that an additional remedy of punitive damages is not available to plaintiffs 
under WARN”). 
 52. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(6). 
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The civil penalties imposed by the WARN Act and the potential for an 
adverse award of attorneys’ fees provide an attractive economic 
incentive for employers like DeShai to promptly compensate aggrieved 
employees upon violation of the WARN Act.  However, before the 
benefit of this compliance incentive can be fully realized, employers 
need clear guidance regarding the manner in which to calculate their 
potential liability to aggrieved employees.  Without such clarification, 
the attractiveness of the compliance incentive is diminished.  This is 
because despite paying an aggrieved employee what the employer deems 
to be its entire liability under the WARN Act, the employer remains 
subject to the possibility that a court may find such payment insufficient, 
thereby exposing the employer to liability for the civil penalties and an 
adverse award of attorneys’ fees. 
This uncertainty with respect to the calculation of an employer’s 
liability actually creates a perverse incentive for an employer to play the 
odds in the event the employer violates the WARN Act.  For example, 
instead of proactively attempting to satisfy liability for a violation on the 
front end, an employer may decide that it makes better economic sense 
to avoid paying aggrieved employees damages unless and until the 
aggrieved employees come forward to challenge the employer’s failure 
to provide proper notice.  Playing the odds is attractive to employers for 
several reasons: (1) where the employer gives only partial notice (notice 
less than the full sixty days), the employees may not challenge the 
failure to provide full notice, in which case the employer potentially may 
escape any WARN Act liability,53 (2) an employer with a cash flow 
problem may find the ability to delay payment of its liability to some 
unknown point in the future to be attractive, in the hopes that when the 
time arrives to actually pay the damages, the cash flow problem will 
have been resolved, thereby making payment of the damages to 
aggrieved employees easier,54 and (3) the employer may wish to take 
advantage of time value of money principles.55  When employers play 
 
 53. This assumes that the government has not sought recovery from the employer 
for the government penalties. 
 54. This assumes that the employer finds that the benefits of delaying damages 
payments outweigh the additional government penalties that will be assessed against the 
company for not paying aggrieved employees damages within three weeks after the 
violation. 
 55. The time value of money principle basically provides that a dollar received or 
spent today is worth more than that same dollar received or spent in the future.  Dustin 
K. Palmer, Comment, Should Prejudgment Interest Be a Matter of Procedural or 
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these odds, it is clear that the purpose of the WARN Act is not being 
served because aggrieved employees are not provided with the intended 
economic protections in the event of a mass layoff or plant closing.  
Thus, implementing clarification amendments that clearly define how 
damages for violation of the WARN Act are to be calculated will both 
eliminate some of these perverse noncompliance incentives and provide 
employers with the certainty needed to serve as incentive for taking 
preemptive action in the event of WARN Act violation. 
III.  COMPLIANCE WITH THE WARN ACT 
Now that DeShai’s VP HR has determined that the planned RIF 
triggers application of the WARN Act and has discovered that DeShai 
does not qualify for an exemption, the VP HR must attempt to decipher 
the ambiguous language of the WARN Act.  After factoring in the civil 
penalties and the potential for adverse awards of attorneys’ fees,  the VP 
HR determines that DeShai’s liability for failing to comply with the 
WARN Act will exceed the amount that DeShai would pay in providing 
the proper sixty days’ notice.  In the current tight economy, or in any 
economy for that matter, it makes good business sense to avoid any 
additional exposure to liability whenever possible. 
Given the CEO’s concern with the bottom line, the VP HR knows she 
must ensure that the steps taken to comply with the WARN Act will 
eliminate any liability.  Balancing the company’s economic objectives 
and legal obligations will not be an easy task.  Even an employer with the 
best intentions (and best employment counsel) may find that determining 
the steps necessary to comply with the WARN Act is a difficult task, at best.  
This is especially true in light of the broad application of the WARN Act. 
A.  Broad Application of an Ambiguous Statute 
The WARN Act cannot be described as well-drafted legislation.  It has 
been criticized as a “clumsily drafted and unduly confusing statute”56 
that is “imprecise, vague, [and] difficult to interpret.”57  Even the 
Department of Labor has recognized that the WARN Act’s language is 
 
Substantive Law in Choice-of-Law Disputes?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 705, 707 n.15 (2002). 
Thus, by not immediately paying damages to aggrieved employees, the employer realizes 
an economic benefit because it can use that money to pay other debts or invest the money 
to earn interest until it is required to pay damages to aggrieved employees.  Again, this 
rationale assumes that the benefit realized from the time value of money is greater than the 
detriment the company will experience by the assessment of government penalties. 
 56. Wilson McLeod, Judicial Devitalization of the WARN Act?, 44 LAB. L.J. 220, 
220 (1993). 
 57. Lipsig & Fentonmiller, supra note 48, at 273. 
CROSS.DOC 1/15/2020  1:37 PM 
[VOL. 40:  711, 2003]  Failure to WARN 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 725 
ambiguous and promotes broad application in order to afford the greatest 
protection to employees.58  The broad application philosophy adopted by 
the government further exacerbates the problems associated with an 
employer’s attempts at compliance.  For this reason, the adoption of the 
WARN Act amendments proposed in this Comment is vital to 
widespread employer compliance with the Act. 
Moreover, the WARN Act regulations recognize that employers may 
face uncertainty in applying the WARN Act.  When an employer is 
uncertain as to its obligations, the WARN Act encourages the provision 
of advance notice in all such circumstances.59  Further, the WARN Act 
and its regulations suggest that employers should provide notice even 
when the notice is clearly not required by the WARN Act.60  Ultimately, 
the ambiguity of the WARN Act causes more compliance problems for 
employers than protection for employees.61  The regulations, 
supplemental information to the final rule contained in the Federal 
Register, and case law only serve to further confuse the issue.62  Thus, in 
order to make the WARN Act more workable and to promote 
compliance, amendments that provide employers definitive guidance are 
desperately needed.  Guidance will be especially helpful in instances 
where an employer opts to use an alternative means of WARN Act 
compliance.  One such alternative means of compliance, the “pay-in-
lieu-of-notice” approach, may be a viable option for DeShai. 
 
 58. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(e) (2002).  “[T]here are some questions and ambiguities 
of interpretation inherent in the application of WARN to business practices in the market 
economy that cannot be addressed in these regulations. . . . The Department encourages 
employers to give notice in all circumstances.”  Id. 
 59. Id. § 639.1(e). 
 60. 29 U.S.C. § 2106 (2000); 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(c). 
 61. See infra Parts IV, V (discussing the debate among the circuit courts regarding 
whether the WARN Act provides remedies that are remedial or punitive in nature and the 
method by which damages to an employee should be calculated). 
 62. The proposal in the WARN Act and supporting regulations that employers 
should simply provide notice in all ambiguous situations is neither helpful nor practical 
because it will very often place an unnecessary burden on an employer that could result 
in devastating financial consequences if the company pays employees sixty days’ worth 
of pay and benefits when it was not otherwise required to do so.  Economically, it would 
not be in the company’s best interests for the company to voluntarily subject itself to the 
requirements of the WARN Act.  Providing such notice could cost the company hundreds 
of thousands of dollars, depending upon the wages of the workers.  To ask a company to 
voluntarily assume such an expense in a tumultuous economic climate is beyond reason.  
In a community like Safire Mountain, that which is in DeShai’s best interests is also in 
the best interests of the community because if DeShai suffers economically, then the 
community similarly feels DeShai’s economic pain through falling revenues. 
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B.  Pay-in-Lieu-of-Notice as an Alternative Means                                         
of  WARN Act Compliance 
Postponing the RIF in order to give the required sixty days’ WARN 
Act notice would frustrate the CEO’s objective of entering the new fiscal 
year with reduced payroll overhead.63  As an alternative to strict 
compliance with the WARN Act, DeShai may consider providing pay-
in-lieu-of-notice to the affected employees.64  Under the pay-in-lieu-of-
notice approach, DeShai would pay the affected employees upfront the 
statutory WARN Act damages resulting from its failure to provide sixty 
days’ advance notice.  By choosing this approach, DeShai, in effect, 
acknowledges its technical violation of the WARN Act and 
preemptively pays to employees the full remedy available to them under 
the Act.  As noted above, if DeShai were to provide employees with the 
appropriate pay-in-lieu-of-notice within three weeks of the violation, 
DeShai would be relieved of liability for the civil penalties imposed for 
violation of the WARN Act.65  In addition, because the remedies provided 
to employees by the WARN Act (namely, back pay and benefits) are the 
employees’ exclusive remedies, DeShai’s provision of properly 
calculated pay-in-lieu-of-notice would relieve the company of all 
WARN Act liability to the aggrieved employees.66 
 
 63. Timing problems are common when dealing with RIFs, and often the 
organizational goals will conflict with an employer’s WARN Act obligations.  Many 
employers are reluctant to implement a RIF and will refrain from taking such action until 
it becomes absolutely necessary.  Therefore, once an employer decides that a RIF is 
necessary, the decision must often be acted upon quickly to meet organizational goals.  
This presents a huge problem when sixty days’ notice of the RIF must be given in order 
to comply with the WARN Act.  Thus, the pay-in-lieu-of-notice approach is attractive as 
an alternative means of compliance with the WARN Act. 
 64. Lipsig & Fentonmiller, supra note 48, at 311–12.  Other employers have used 
the strategy of placing the affected employees on a paid leave of absence during the 
notice period.  This approach is often favorable when an employer does not wish to make 
a lump sum damages payment to aggrieved employees and is concerned that employees 
will engage in sabotage during the notice period if allowed to remain on the job.  Id.  
This approach may also be a good option when an employer cannot calculate with 
certainty its WARN Act damages due to lack of case law interpreting the ambiguities in 
the WARN Act as to such damages calculations. Under the paid leave of absence 
approach, employees stay on the payroll and continue to receive their usual pay and 
benefits but are relieved of their duties.  Although this approach does not guarantee that a 
court will find full WARN Act compliance, the Fifth Circuit has determined that an 
employer who places affected employees on a fully paid, excused leave of absence 
during the sixty day notice period has complied with the underlying purpose of the 
WARN Act.  Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.3d 930, 935 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(“WARN was intended to provide employees with notice so that they could adjust to the 
layoff and locate other work.  Fully-paid excused leave complies with these purposes.”). 
 65. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3); see also Lipsig & Fentonmiller, supra note 48, at 311–12. 
 66. See Ass’n of W. Pulp & Paper Workers v. Grays Harbor Paper Co., No. C93-
5226B, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13094, at *26 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 1994) (allowing an 
employer to offset its WARN Act liability with the voluntary and unconditional 
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The pay-in-lieu-of-notice approach may prove to be an attractive 
alternative for DeShai because it would allow the company to terminate 
the employees immediately and pay damages during the current fiscal 
year, thereby allowing projections for the next fiscal year to be based on 
the reduced payroll overhead figure that the CEO is seeking.  However, 
the disadvantage of this approach is that it is nearly impossible for 
employers to calculate the proper pay-in-lieu-of-notice.  The reason for 
this difficulty is threefold: (1) there is ambiguity regarding whether the 
WARN Act provides for a compensatory “make-whole” remedy67 or a 
punitive remedy,68 (2) there is disagreement among the circuit courts as 
to what is included in “back pay” for purposes of calculating WARN Act 
damages,69 and (3) the circuit courts are split with regard to whether the 
calculation of damages is based on the number of calendar or working 
days during the violation period.70  Thus, until either the U.S. Supreme 
Court resolves the split between the circuits, which is unlikely to happen 
anytime soon,71 or Congress amends the WARN Act to clarify the 
 
payments consisting of full compensation and benefits for the sixty day notice period 
that the employer has made to affected employees); see also Lipsig & Fentonmiller, 
supra note 48, at 311 (“The WARN Act does not explicitly state that an employer may 
give employees pay-in-lieu-of-notice, but voluntarily doing so can totally eliminate any 
WARN Act liability the employer may have.”). 
 67. The terms “remedial” and “make-whole” will be used interchangeably in this 
Comment, in a way that is consistent with the terminology used by the courts.  See Local 
Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 
1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting “the primary purpose of the Act is remedial” and that 
“‘back pay’ under the WARN Act is a make-whole compensatory remedy”), cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 973 (2001) 
 68. See infra Part IV. 
 69. See infra Part V.A. 
 70. See infra Part V.B; see also Lipsig & Fentonmiller, supra note 48, at 311–12; 
Jeffrey J. Turner, Comment, Damages Under the Workers Adjustment and Retraining 
Act (WARN): Why Damages Cannot be Based on Calendar Days, 12 T.M. COOLEY L. 
REV. 197, 203–08 (1995). 
 71. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly passed on the opportunity to resolve 
the split in the circuit courts.  See, e.g., Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d at 1158–59, cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 973 (2001); Burns v. Stone Forest Indus., 147 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th 
Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1040 (1998); Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking Cos., 
140 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 921 (1998); Carpenters Dist. 
Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1283–86 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); United Steelworkers of America v. North Star Steel Co., 5 
F.3d 39, 42–43 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114 (1994).  There are many 
reasons that could be behind the U.S. Supreme Court’s denials of certiorari.  For 
example, the Court may find the issue relatively unimportant or may want the issue and 
analysis to develop further among the circuit courts before weighing in on the matter.  
Whatever the reason for the Court’s continual denials to resolve this issue, the 
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definition of back pay and whether the calculation of such damages is 
based on the number of working days or calendar days that fall within the 
violation period, an employer cannot be sure that adopting the pay-in-lieu- 
of-notice approach will completely extinguish its WARN Act liability. 
IV. THE WARN ACT PROVIDES FOR A COMPENSATORY,                      
“MAKE-WHOLE” REMEDY 
A core problematic area of ambiguity in the WARN Act is its 
provision for an employee’s remedy of back pay and benefits in the 
event of an employer’s WARN Act violation.72  At the core of the debate 
over the method of calculating back pay for the period of the WARN 
Act violation is the issue of whether the remedy provided by the WARN 
Act is compensatory, make-whole, or punitive in nature.  Unfortunately, 
courts are not in agreement over this issue.73 
A. The Majority View 
The majority of the circuit courts that have considered the type of 
remedies afforded by the WARN Act subscribe to the theory that the 
WARN Act provides employees with a compensatory, make-whole 
remedy.74  Recently, in Local Joint Executive Board of Culinary/ 
Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals declared that “the primary purpose of the [WARN] Act is 
remedial” as opposed to punitive.75  There, the Las Vegas Sands hotel 
and casino ordered a closure and provided employees with only forty-
five days’ notice, rather than the sixty days’ notice required under the 
 
ambiguous language of the WARN Act will continue to cause interpretative problems 
until either Congress amends the Act or the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari. 
 72. The WARN Act provides that any employer who conducts a mass layoff or 
plant closing in violation of the Act shall be liable to aggrieved employees for “back pay 
for each day of violation” and “benefits under an employee benefit plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 
2104(a)(1) (2002). 
 73. The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits all agree that the WARN Act provides for 
a compensatory, make-whole remedy for aggrieved employees.  Under such a theory, the 
workers are provided with the amount of pay and benefits that they would have earned 
during the violation period.  See Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d. at 1158–59; Saxion v. 
Titan-C-Mfg., Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 560–61 (6th Cir. 1996); Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1283–86.  
But see United Steelworkers, 5 F.3d at 42–43 (concluding that “back pay” is merely a 
label and the calculation of damages is to be based on calendar days, as opposed to 
working days, during the violation period, resulting in a punitive remedy). 
 74. See Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d at 1159 (“‘[B]ack pay’ under the WARN Act is 
a make-whole compensatory remedy . . . .”); Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1284 & n.14; Shannon 
v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 45 P.3d 345, 350 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (“The primary 
purpose of the WARN Act is remedial.”). 
 75. Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d at 1159. 
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WARN Act.76  The court found that, given the make-whole remedy 
provided for by the WARN Act, the employees should be compensated 
for the money that they would have earned “but for the premature 
closure in violation of the WARN Act.”77  In an earlier case, Burns v. 
Stone Forest Industries, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had 
likened the remedy provided to employees under the WARN Act to 
business interruption insurance that protects employees’ income stream 
in the event they are told on payday that the plant is closing that 
afternoon.78  Building on its prior analysis in Burns, the Ninth Circuit in 
Las Vegas Sands further explained that in enacting the WARN Act, 
Congress had been concerned with insuring an employee’s income 
stream,79 as evidenced by a Senate report that explicitly stated the 
WARN Act’s purpose to “eas[e] the personal and financial difficulties 
for workers who must make these transitions.”80 
Support for the majority interpretation of the WARN Act is 
intensifying.  In United Mine Workers v. Midwest Coal Co., the Indiana 
District Court found the Las Vegas Sands analysis persuasive and 
concluded that the WARN Act provides for a make-whole remedy and is 
remedial in nature.81  The Midwest Coal court recognized that the 
primary purpose of the WARN Act is to provide advance notice of plant 
closings and mass layoffs.82  However, the court further recognized that 
the WARN Act clearly has another purpose: “to provide the effected 
[sic] employees as close as possible with the pay they would have 
otherwise earned but for the plant closing and WARN Act violation.”83 
 
 76. Id. at 1156. 
 77. Id. at 1159. 
 78. Burns v. Stone Forest Indus., 147 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 79. Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d at 1159. 
 80. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-62, at 3 (1987)).  The Senate report analyzed the 
Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act, from which the 
provisions of the WARN Act were eventually severed and enacted as separate 
legislation.  Id.; S. REP. NO. 100-62 (1987). 
 81. United Mine Workers v. Midwest Coal Co., No. TH 99-C-141-T/H, 2001 WL 
1385893, at *4–6 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 31, 2001).  The court found Las Vegas Sands 
persuasive for two reasons: (1) it is in accord with the majority of other courts in 
concluding that damages provided by the WARN Act are intended to make the aggrieved 
employee whole, and (2) legislative history of the WARN Act “supports the conclusion 
that the Act is remedial.”  Id. at *5–6. 
 82. Id. at *6. 
 83. Id. 
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B.  The Minority View 
A small minority of courts cling to the theory that the WARN Act is a 
punitive statute.84  In Joshlin v. Gannett River States Publishing Corp., 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas grounded its 
conclusion that the WARN Act provides for a punitive remedy in the 
fact that an employer may not offset its WARN Act violation liability 
with wages received by the employee from other sources during the 
violation period.85  The Joshlin court interpreted the disallowance of an 
offset as evidence of congressional intent to maximize the punitive effect 
of the damages allowable under the WARN Act.86 
That the employee remedies under the WARN Act are not purely 
remedial in nature does not jeopardize the basic remedial nature of the 
employee’s remedy.  In Carpenters District Council v. Dillard 
Department Stores, the Fifth Circuit found the remedy provided to 
employees to be compensatory and make-whole in nature and suggested 
that Congress may have intended to not make the remedy purely 
remedial.87  For example, Congress, in choosing to not make the remedy 
available to aggrieved employees purely remedial, avoided placing on 
employees the burden of immediately seeking other employment in 
order to mitigate damages.88  One purpose of the WARN Act is to 
“provid[e] workers and their families some transition time to adjust to 
the . . . loss of employment.”89  Requiring an employee to mitigate his 
damages would frustrate this underlying purpose;90 therefore, a purely 
remedial scheme would not serve the purpose of the WARN Act.  
However, the fact that the remedy available to employees under the 
WARN Act is not purely remedial does not prevent it from being 
 
 84. See United Steelworkers of America v. North Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39, 42–43 
(3d Cir. 1993) (adopting a calculation of damages based on calendar days that occur 
during the violation period).  The North Star Steel approach has been construed as 
affording a punitive remedy.  See Joshlin v. Gannett River States Publ’g Corp., 840 F. 
Supp. 660, 663 (E.D. Ark. 1993) (“This is a punitive statute, not a ‘make-whole’ 
statute.”). 
 85. Joshlin, 840 F. Supp. at 663.  The court determined that the plain meaning of 
the statute subjects the violating employer to payment for each day of violation and that 
a day of violation “may be a work day, a non-work day, a holiday, a weekend day, or any 
day.”  Id.  Thus, the damages are not compensatory, but punitive in nature.  Id. 
 86. Id. (“Congress sought to maximize the punitive effect of the liability provision 
[of the WARN Act] by prohibiting employees [sic] from offsetting the back pay remedy 
with any pay that its former employees receive from a subsequent employer.”). 
 87. Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1284 n.14 
(5th Cir. 1994). 
 88. Id. 
 89. 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a) (2002). 
 90. See Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1284 n.14. 
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“generally remedial.”91  Thus, as the Dillard court concluded, the basic 
compensatory nature of the WARN Act’s remedy remains intact.92 
In Local 1239, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Allsteel, 
Inc.,93 the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found 
unpersuasive the employee’s argument that the WARN Act provides for 
a punitive remedy, thus requiring an employer to provide “penalties” to 
its aggrieved employees just as it requires “civil penalties” to the 
government.94  While the WARN Act does provide a punitive remedy to 
the government by imposing the (up to) $500 per day civil penalty for 
violation, the fact that one remedy under the WARN Act is punitive in 
nature does not logically lead to the conclusion that all remedies under 
the WARN Act, including the employee’s remedy, are punitive in 
nature.  Indeed, the WARN Act’s textual description of the employer’s 
liability to the government as a “civil penalty” and to employees as 
“back pay” is instructive.  Nowhere in the WARN Act is the term 
“penalty” used to describe the remedy afforded to employees.95  Thus, 
Congress, in denoting the remedy for the government as a “penalty” and 
the remedy for the employee as “back pay,” has distinguished the two 
remedies.  Such differentiation supports the proposition that employer 
damages to employees under the WARN Act are not penalties.96 
The last bit of hope for the minority’s interpretation of the WARN Act 
remedies as punitive lies in the fact that the Act’s legislative history at 
times refers to the statutory damages afforded by the WARN Act as a 
penalty.97  Because the WARN Act requires an employer to provide 
back pay and benefits to an aggrieved employee who is no longer 
providing services, the Act, in a sense, penalizes the employer.98  
However, simply because the damages provided to the employee may be 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. 9 F. Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
 94. Id. at 903–05. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Shannon v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 45 P.3d 345, 350–51 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2002) (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-62, at 24 (1987)).  Although Senate Report 100-62 
provided that the employees’ remedy under the WARN Act “is in effect a liquidated 
damages provisions [sic], designed to penalize the wrongdoing employer, deter future 
violations, and facilitate simplified damages proceedings,” S. REP. NO. 100-62, at 24 
(1987), the Shannon court concluded that it did not “believe Congress intended the 
WARN Act to be used to punish an employer.”  Shannon, 45 P.3d at 351. 
 98. Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking Cos., 140 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 1998). 
CROSS.DOC 1/15/2020  1:37 PM 
 
732 
viewed as punitive on one level does not change the fact that the 
damages are aimed at making the employee whole for the employer’s 
violation.  The payments to the employee can be characterized as “both 
‘damages’ to the employer and ‘back pay’ to the employee.”99  Such 
dual characterization does not change the overriding purpose of the 
remedy: to make the employee whole.100 
C. Amendment to Proclaim the Remedy as Compensatory                       
and Make-Whole 
To effectively resolve the disagreement among the courts, the WARN 
Act should be amended to clarify that the remedy afforded to aggrieved 
employees is a compensatory, make-whole remedy.101  This amendment 
will assist employers, like DeShai, in assessing their liability and in 
ensuring that damages paid to employees in the event of a violation are 
sufficient to extinguish the employer’s liability.102  A legislative 
resolution to the split in the circuit courts is preferable to a judicial 
resolution because Congress is able to address all of the ambiguities 
surrounding the damages provisions of the WARN Act, whereas the 
U.S. Supreme Court would be confined to resolving the issue in the case 
before it.  Thus, a statutory amendment would be the most effective 
approach to setting out a clear rule with respect to WARN Act damages.  
In light of, and in conjunction with the statutory amendment, the WARN 
Act regulations should be amended to provide guidance with regard to 
the calculation of damages. 
V.  CALCULATION OF DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION                                                  
OF THE WARN ACT 
An employer who violates the WARN Act is liable to the aggrieved 
 
 99. Fegatelli v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 765 N.E.2d 961, 964 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2001). 
 100. See Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas 
Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 973 (2001). 
 101. Suggested language for the amendment may include an addition to 29 U.S.C. § 
2104(a)(1) that provides: “The remedy afforded to aggrieved employees for an 
employer’s violation of the WARN Act is a compensatory, make-whole remedy.”  A 
similar amendment to the WARN Act regulations should also be made. 
 102. Specifically, declaring the employee’s remedy as a compensatory, make-whole 
remedy will assist in the resolution of the debate over whether the calculation of back 
pay should be based on the number of calendar or working days that occur during the 
violation period.  As discussed, infra Part IV, accepting the majority view that the 
employee’s remedy is compensatory and make-whole leads to the logical conclusion that 
the calculation of back pay must be based on the number of working days that occur 
during the sixty day notice period and must include any payment for wages and benefits 
that the employee would have received had he continued to work during that period. 
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employees for “back pay for each day of violation.”103  The problem 
with this statutory provision is two-fold: (1) the WARN Act and its 
regulations do not define “back pay,”104 and (2) the WARN Act and its 
regulations do not specify whether the calculation of back pay is to be 
based on the number of calendar or working days that fall within the 
violation period.  Unfortunately, circuit courts have been unable to agree 
on an interpretation of the WARN Act remedy provisions105 and the U.S. 
Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to grant certiorari to resolve the 
interpretive issues.106  Without clear guidance on these two points, 
employers like DeShai that wish to adopt the pay-in-lieu-of-notice 
approach cannot be assured of full WARN Act compliance.107 
As a solution, Congress should amend the WARN Act to include a 
definition of “back pay” as well as a designation that the calculation of 
damages is to be based on the number of working days during the 
violation period.  Such amendments would both make the WARN Act 
easier for employers like DeShai to apply and quiet much of the 
litigation surrounding these hotly debated issues. 
A.  The “Back Pay” Ambiguity 
Under the theory that the WARN Act provides a compensatory, make-
whole remedy for aggrieved employees, the WARN Act should be 
amended to define back pay as compensation for any pay and non-
ERISA benefits that would have been earned by employees if the 
 
 103. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)(A).  The rate of pay at which back pay shall be 
calculated shall be the higher of (1) an average of the employee’s regular rate over the 
previous three years of employment or (2) the employee’s final rate of pay.  Id. 
 104. See United Mine Workers v. Midwest Coal Co., No. TH 99-C-141-T/H, 2001 
WL 1385893, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 31, 2001) (“What forms of compensation constitute 
‘back pay’ is left unanswered by the text of the statute.”). 
 105. Turner, supra note 70, at 199. 
 106. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 71. 
 107. An employer electing to use the pay-in-lieu-of-notice approach is no doubt 
taking a risk that the amount paid to employees may not fully cover its WARN Act 
liability, depending on the current state of the law in the circuit in which the employee is 
employed.  It is important to note that when an employee is employed in a state covered 
by a circuit court that has not yet decided the issue of which method should be used to 
calculated back pay, the employer is left with little guidance on how to calculate such 
payment to the employees.  The employer is, in a sense, taking a leap of faith that the 
amount paid to the employees is sufficient to extinguish liability.  However, there is 
always a possibility of a lawsuit by terminated employees that could cost the employer 
large sums of money, especially if the terminated employees were to initiate a class 
action lawsuit. 
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employees had been given the required notice and if they had continued 
working during the notice period.  Under such a definition, the employer 
would take a snapshot view of the amount that the employee would have 
earned during the violation period; that amount would constitute the 
amount of back pay owed as damages.  Adopting this “snapshot” 
approach would greatly assist employers like DeShai in determining 
their WARN Act liability because it gives employers a concise test to 
apply when the question arises as to whether a certain form of 
compensation should be included in the back pay calculation.  The 
employer would simply ask one question: “Would the employee have 
earned this compensation but for the failure to provide proper WARN 
Act notice?”  If the answer is in the affirmative, the compensation would 
be included in the back pay calculation. 
1.  What Constitutes “Back Pay”? 
For years the circuit courts have struggled with the question of just 
what should be included in back pay for purposes of determining an 
employer’s WARN Act liability.  In interpreting what is meant by back 
pay for purposes of the WARN Act, courts have turned to the definition 
of back pay used in other federal statutes.108  As used in various federal 
statutes, including the WARN Act, back pay has been interpreted in the 
normal sense to include the following: payment for work performed on 
holidays,109 tips,110 overtime,111 fringe benefits such as vacation and sick 
pay,112 and shift differentials.113  In addition, courts interpreting the 
 
 108. See, e.g., Joint Local Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las 
Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing, among others, Pettway v. 
Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 263 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that back pay under 
Title VII includes salary as well as “[i]nterest, overtime, shift differentials, and fringe 
benefits such as vacation and sick pay”)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 973 (2001); see also 
infra notes 110–113. 
 109. Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d at 1156 (finding that “employees who can prove 
that they would have worked on a holiday are entitled to back pay at the rate they would 
have been paid for that holiday”). 
 110. Id. (finding that back pay includes tip income). 
 111. See Kossman v. Calumet County, 849 F.2d 1027, 1032–33 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(including overtime pay in back pay calculation under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act).  In the WARN Act arena, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of West Virginia recently concluded that the inclusion of overtime in the back pay 
calculation for a WARN Act violation is appropriate.  United Mine Workers v. Martinka 
Coal Co., 45 F. Supp. 2d 521, 527 (N.D.W. Va. 1999), aff’d, 202 F.3d 717 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 112. See Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1549, 1562 (11th Cir. 
1986) (finding that vacation and sick pay are included in back pay under Title VII); 
Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939, 940, 947–48 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding that 
fringe benefits including vacation and sick pay are included in back pay under Title VII); 
Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 263 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that 
vacation and sick pay are ingredients of back pay in a Title VII suit). 
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WARN Act have recently moved toward the adoption of a broad view of 
back pay, according to which back pay includes non-ERISA fringe 
benefits such as vacation, graduated vacation, floating vacation, and 
personal days on the basis that they are “contractual days.”114  Given the 
compensatory, make-whole remedy provided by the WARN Act, this 
broad view of back pay is most consistent with the intended purpose of 
the WARN Act. 
However, William Cowen recently wrote an article advocating that the 
WARN Act does not allow for the recovery of non-ERISA benefits.115  
To support his argument that the definition of back pay has become too 
broad and that a narrow reading to exclude non-ERISA fringe benefits is 
the only reasonable interpretation,116 Cowen relies on three district court 
cases: Ciarlante v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,117 Carpenters 
District Council v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc.,118 and Jones v. 
Kayser-Roth Hosiery, Inc.119  However, these cases do not represent the 
 
 113. Nichols v. Frank, 771 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (D. Or. 1991) (finding that night 
and weekend shift differentials are included in back pay calculations under Title VII), 
aff’d, 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 114. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Midwest Coal Co., No. TH 99-C-141-T/H, 
2001 WL 1385893, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 31, 2001) (finding that aggrieved employees 
are entitled to be paid for non-ERISA contractual days under the WARN Act); Martinka 
Coal Co., 45 F. Supp. 2d at 530 (finding that aggrieved employees are entitled to recover 
non-ERISA fringe benefits that would have accrued during the violation period). 
 115. William B. Cowen et al., An Argument that the WARN Act Does Not Allow 
Plaintiffs to Recover Non-ERISA Benefits, 16 LAB. LAW. 269 (2000).  Cowen, a member 
of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), served as an attorney for the NLRB 
from 1979 to 1985 and was in private practice until his appointment as an NLRB 
member in January 2002.  United States National Labor Relations Board, William B. 
Cowen, at http://www.nlrb.gov/cowen.html (last updated Mar. 13, 2002).  The NLRB was 
created by Congress to administer the National Labor Relations Act, a statute that 
“guarantees the right of employees to organize and to bargain collectively with their 
employers or to refrain from all such activity.”  United States National Labor Relations 
Board, Fact Sheet on the National Labor Relations Board, at http://www.nlrb.gov/ 
facts.html (last updated Dec. 4, 2002).  The NLRB has two major functions: (1) to 
determine whether employees desire union representation and (2) to prevent and remedy 
unfair labor practices of employers and unions.  Id.  In essence, the NLRB serves to 
protect employees.  Thus, it is somewhat puzzling that Cowen is advocating a narrow 
interpretation of the WARN Act damages provisions that would exclude non-ERISA 
benefits, thereby affording laid-off employees less protection. 
 116. Cowen et. al., supra note 115, at 273, 278–80. 
 117. No. 95-4646, 1996 WL 741973 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 1996), rev’d, 143 F.3d 139 
(3d Cir. 1998). 
 118. 778 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. La. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 15 F.3d 1275 
(5th Cir. 1994). 
 119. 748 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Tenn. 1990), amended by 753 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1990). 
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current majority view and reliance on them is misplaced. 
In Ciarlante, the court determined that the inclusion of fringe benefits 
in back pay under the WARN Act was limited to ERISA benefits 
only.120  The Ciarlante court,  a district court within the Third Circuit, 
did not subscribe to the majority view that the WARN Act provides for a 
compensatory, make-whole remedy.  Instead, the court premised its 
interpretation of the remedy provision on the minority view, as 
expressed by the Third Circuit in United Steelworkers of America v. 
North Star Steel Co.,121 that the WARN Act remedy is not compensatory 
in nature.  The Ciarlante court accepted the Third Circuit’s interpretation as 
binding but admitted that the interpretation “has not been universally 
accepted.”122  This begs the question whether Ciarlante would have been 
decided differently had the district court not been bound by North Star Steel. 
The district court in Dillard disallowed a credit against an employer’s 
WARN Act liability for accrued vacation paid to employees, a non-
ERISA benefit.123  In dicta, the court implied that a credit may have been 
allowed had state law not imposed on the employer a legal obligation to 
pay accrued vacation.124  In his article, Cowen claims that this dicta “can 
be logically extended to imply that any [non-ERISA] benefit paid to 
employees . . . [is] not a benefit recoverable under the WARN Act.”125  
The primary weakness of Cowen’s “logically extended” implication is its 
basis in district court dicta.  Further, this Dillard opinion was issued in 
1991.  Since that time, many other courts have weighed in on the issue and 
have allowed recovery of non-ERISA benefits under the WARN Act.126 
Similarly, in 1990 the district court in Jones127 found that employers 
were not required to pay employees for vacation benefits that would 
have accrued had the employees worked during the sixty day violation 
period.128  Because this decision was handed down well before the 
current trend toward inclusion of non-ERISA benefits in WARN Act 
damages, its value as support for Cowen’s argument is questionable. 
In addition to his reliance on the above district court cases, Cowen 
also points to the WARN Act’s express terms, which provide that 
aggrieved employees are entitled to benefits that they would have 
received under an ERISA benefits plan.  These benefits include the cost 
 
 120. Ciarlante, 1996 WL 741973, at *3. 
 121. 5 F.3d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 122. Ciarlante, 1996 WL 741973, at *2. 
 123. Dillard, 778 F. Supp. at 311. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Cowen et. al., supra note 115, at 279–80. 
 126. See infra notes 134–137 and accompanying text. 
 127. 748 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Tenn. 1990), amended by 753 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1990). 
 128. Id. at 1301. 
CROSS.DOC 1/15/2020  1:37 PM 
[VOL. 40:  711, 2003]  Failure to WARN 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 737 
of any medical expenses incurred during the violation period that would 
have been covered by the benefit plan had the employer not violated the 
WARN Act.129 Cowen argues that if back pay were interpreted to 
include non-ERISA fringe benefits, section 2104(a)(1)(B) of the WARN 
Act, which entitles aggrieved employees to ERISA benefits, would be 
devoid of meaning and thus superfluous.130  Therefore, he concludes, 
“‘[b]ack pay,’ as used in the WARN Act, must describe something less 
than all pay and all benefits.”131 
This narrow interpretation of back pay is inconsistent with both the 
purpose of the WARN Act and the compensatory, make-whole remedy 
provided for by the Act.  As previously established, the majority view is 
that the WARN act provides for a compensatory, make-whole remedy 
that includes the pay and benefits that the employee would have received 
during the violation period.132  If an employer provides the sixty days’ 
notice as required by the WARN Act, employees who accrue non-
ERISA benefits, such as holiday and vacation pay, will continue to 
accrue them during the sixty days.  An employer who violates the 
WARN Act notice requirement, thereby preventing employees from 
working during the sixty day notice period,133 should not then be 
excused from compensating employees for the holiday and vacation pay 
that would have accrued had the employer not violated the Act.  If 
employees are not entitled to recover for the holiday and vacation pay 
that they would have accrued during the violation period, they are 
certainly not made whole by the employer’s payment of damages.  
Moreover, the violating employer will benefit from its own violation.  
Such a result is inequitable and frustrates the purpose of the WARN Act. 
The trend of recent WARN Act case law is toward an interpretation 
that includes non-ERISA benefits in the definition of back pay.  In 2001, 
the Ninth Circuit proclaimed in Las Vegas Sands that tip income and pay 
for work on holidays are deemed to be included in the definition of back 
 
 129. See Cowen et al., supra note 115, at 273; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 130. Cowen et al., supra note 115, at 273.  The rule of statutory interpretation 
provides that a reading of the statute that would make another provision of the same 
statute superfluous should be avoided.  United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 
30, 36 (1992). 
 131. Cowen et. al., supra note 115, at 273. 
 132. See supra Part III.A. 
 133. See Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas 
Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he employer’s obligation to pay 
was triggered[] by the fact that [the employer] prevented the employees’ performance by 
closing their workplace.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 973 (2001). 
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pay.134  The Ninth Circuit based its interpretation of back pay on the 
premise that employees should be compensated for the money that they 
would have earned during the notice period had the employer given 
proper notice.135  Also in 2001, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Indiana, in United Mine Workers v. Midwest Coal Co.,136 
found the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Las Vegas Sands to be 
persuasive and adopted a broad view of back pay that included non-
ERISA benefits.137  This trend in decisions is due to wide acceptance of 
the underlying principle that the WARN Act provides employees a 
compensatory, make-whole remedy.  To make employees whole, all 
benefits that would have been earned during the violation period, 
including non-ERISA benefits, should be included in the damages 
payment. 
2.  A Resolution to the “Back Pay” Ambiguity 
The WARN Act should be amended to define back pay as any pay and 
non-ERISA benefits that the employee would have earned had he been 
allowed to continue working during the violation period.  Under this 
definition, employers would take a snapshot of that amount that the 
employee would have earned during this period and would then pay the 
employee the full amount of these earnings.  The proposed amendment 
and snapshot test are consistent with the normal meaning of back pay 
and serve the overall purpose of the WARN Act138 by putting the 
employee in the same position he would have been in had his 
employment not been prematurely terminated in violation of the WARN 
Act.  In addition, including a definition of back pay in the WARN Act 
will serve to put to rest much of the litigation surrounding the current 
remedy ambiguity of the Act.139  Further, the adoption of the snapshot 
test provides employers with clear guidance in calculating back pay.  
The back pay definition and snapshot test in turn assist employers like 
 
 134. Id. at 1156. 
 135. Id. at 1159.  The court adopts “the normal meaning of back pay” and finds this 
meaning “consistent with the overall purpose of the WARN Act.”  Id. at 1158. 
 136. No. TH 99-C-141-T/H, 2001 WL 1385893 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 31, 2001). 
 137. Id. at *7 (holding that, under the WARN Act, plaintiffs are entitled to be paid for 
non-ERISA contractual paid days off, including “vacation, graduated vacation, floating 
vacation and personal days”); see also United Mine Workers v. Martinka Coal. Co., 45 
F. Supp. 2d 521, 530 (N.D.W. Va. 1999) (“[T]he concept of back pay includes not only 
wages, but also all the fringe benefits the employee would have earned had the violation 
not occurred.”). 
 138. Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d at 1158. 
 139. Reducing litigation will ease the cost of litigation burden not only on 
employers, but also on the taxpayers whose tax dollars fund the judicial system tasked 
with resolving these disputes. 
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DeShai in heading off potential litigation by giving them the necessary 
tools and guidance to calculate WARN Act liability with certainty, 
thereby removing the risk from the pay-in-lieu-of-notice approach.140  
Lastly, a back pay definition will prove especially helpful for multistate 
employers whose employees are dispersed over a large area and are thus 
governed by circuit courts that may subscribe to different interpretations 
of the WARN Act remedy provisions.141 
B.  Calendar Days Versus Working Days 
Once an employer knows what constitutes back pay, the question 
arises as to whether the back pay must be provided for the number of 
calendar days or working days during the period of the employer’s 
violation.  The WARN Act should be amended to make clear that an 
employee’s WARN Act damages must be provided for the total number 
of working days that fall within the violation period.  Not only would 
such an amendment be consistent with the snapshot test discussed above, 
it would also put to rest the current split between the circuit courts on the 
issue.  Because the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to settle the issue 
of whether the calculation of damages is based on the number of 
calendar or working days,142 employers have been forced to deal with 
the unresolved split between the circuits for nearly a decade.143  An 
amendment to the WARN Act is long overdue. 
An amendment establishing that the calculation of WARN Act 
damages is based on the number of working days rather than calendar 
days is supported by the majority of the circuit courts that have 
 
 140. Included in the risks an employer analyzes when faced with a RIF is the 
likelihood of a lawsuit resulting from the RIF.  Unless the employer is willing to provide 
consideration in addition to the statutory remedy, the employer will not be able to obtain 
a release of claims from employees.  Thus, when the employer makes the decision to pay 
damages in lieu of notice, it obviously would like to ensure, to the greatest extent 
possible, that the amount paid will extinguish any liability it may have for violating the 
WARN Act. 
 141. Employers in this situation are uncertain as to which circuit to follow if the 
circuit in which the employees are located has not decided the issue.  This situation also 
raises the issue of how to treat employees working in states in which the courts have 
employed diverging interpretations of the WARN Act remedy provisions. 
 142. See cases cited supra note 71. 
 143. See Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1283–86 
(5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); United Steelworkers of America v. North 
Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39, 42–43 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114 (1994). 
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addressed the issue.144  Basing damages on working days compensates 
employees for the income and benefits they would have received had the 
employer not prematurely terminated their employment in violation of 
the WARN Act.145  This approach fulfills the purpose of the WARN Act 
by making the employees whole.146  Moreover, legislative history 
supports this interpretation.  The Senate Labor Committee stated in 1987 
that damages for a violation of the WARN Act “are to be measured by 
the wages . . . the employee would have received had the plant remained 
open or the layoff been deferred until the conclusion of the notice 
period.”147  Therefore, because damages are measured by “the wages the 
employee would have received,” the working days method is the 
appropriate basis for calculating damages.148 
1.  The Third Circuit’s “Unique” View 
Of the circuits that have ruled on the calendar versus working days 
debate, only one circuit continues to cling to the calendar day calculation 
approach.  The Third Circuit, in United Steelworkers of America v. 
North Star Steel Co.,149 found that the language of the WARN Act 
unambiguously points to a plain meaning interpretation that an employer 
who violates the WARN Act is liable for back pay for each calendar day 
of the violation period.150  In North Star Steel, the defendant did not 
contest its liability for failure to give the required notice.  Rather, the 
disputed issue was whether the calculation of damages for back pay and 
benefits should be based on the number of calendar or working days 
during the violation period.151  The Third Circuit rejected the argument 
 
 144. See Local 1239, Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Allsteel, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 901, 
903 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“[T]he majority rule is that the employer is liable only for work 
days within the period of the violation.”) and cases cited therein. 
 145. See Saxion v. Titan-C-Mfg., Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 560–61 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing 
Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 15 F.3d 1275, 1283–86 (5th Cir. 
1994)); Local 1239, Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 904. 
 146. See Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas 
Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that back pay under the 
WARN Act is a make-whole remedy allowing damages to compensate the employee for 
the lack of notice by the employer), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 973 (2001). 
 147. S. REP. NO. 100-62, at 24 (1987); see also Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking 
Cos., 140 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-62, at 24 (1987)); 
Saxion, 86 F.3d at 559 (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-62, at 24 (1987)). 
 148. See Breedlove, 140 F.3d at 801 (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-62, at 24 (1987)). 
 149. 5 F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 150. Id. at 42. 
 151. Id. at 41.  At the time the Third Circuit was presented with this issue, no other 
circuit court had issued an opinion on the issue.  See id.  However, by the time the Third 
Circuit issued its ruling, the Fifth Circuit had pending before it the very same issue in 
Carpenters District Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., see id., but the matter was not 
decided by the Fifth Circuit until five months after North Star Steel was decided.  See 
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that back pay was intended to mean lost earnings during the violation 
period and instead interpreted back pay as merely “a label used to 
describe the amount of damages for which an employer is liable for each 
day of the violation,”152 which should then be multiplied by the number 
of calendar days of violation.153 
The Third Circuit’s rationale for this interpretation was threefold.  
First, the court applied the statutory interpretation maxim that an 
interpretation that renders other provisions of a statute superfluous 
should be avoided.154  The Third Circuit reasoned that if back pay meant 
lost earnings, subsection 2104(a)(2) of the WARN Act, which allows 
employer offsets for wages already paid,155 would be superfluous 
because a “lost earnings calculation would automatically exclude the 
reductions” for wages paid.156 
The Third Circuit’s interpretation of back pay commits the same sin of 
statutory interpretation that the court sought to avoid.  Subsection 
2104(a)(1)(A) clearly sets forth the rate of compensation upon which to 
base WARN Act damages.157  Thus, the Third Circuit’s position that 
“each day of the violation” is intended to refer to calendar days and that 
back pay refers to the individual’s pay rate, which is to be multiplied by 
the number of calendar days, violates fundamental statutory interpretation 
rules by rendering subsections 2104(a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) superfluous.158  
This is because if back pay is merely a label for the rate of compensation 
of WARN Act damages, as suggested by the Third Circuit, there would 
be no need for yet another definition of the rate of damages in 
subsections 2104(a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii). 
 
Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1275 (5th Cir. 
1995).  The Fifth Circuit, in issuing its decision in Dillard, kicked off the circuit split 
when it held that the calculation of damages was to be based on the number of working 
days that fall within the violation period.  See id. at 1283–86. 
 152. North Star Steel, 5 F.3d at 42. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.  Subsection 2104(a)(2) allows an employer to offset its WARN Act 
damages by “any wages paid by the employer to the employee for the period of the 
violation.”  29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(2) (2000). 
 156. North Star Steel, 5 F.3d at 42. 
 157. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)(A).  This section provides that back pay shall be 
awarded “at a rate of compensation not less than the higher of (i) the average regular rate 
received by such employee during the last 3 years of the employee’s employment; or (ii) 
the final regular rate received by such employee.”  Id. 
 158. Turner, supra note 70, at 221. 
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Second, the Third Circuit reasoned that interpreting back pay to mean 
lost earnings would lead to “absurd or unreasonable results.”159  
According to the Third Circuit’s reasoning, if subsection 2104(a)(2) 
were not superfluous, an employer would receive double credit for the 
wage payments to the employee.160  An employer would be able to 
subtract the wage payments the first time in conjunction with the 
calculation of back pay under subsection 2104(a)(1) and then a second 
time pursuant to subsection 2104(a)(2).  Because such a result would be 
unreasonable, the Third Circuit argued, the working days approach 
should not be adopted.161 
While giving an employer double credit for the wages paid to an 
employee would be unreasonable, the terms of subsection 2104(a)(2) 
prevent such double counting.162  The Fifth Circuit, in Carpenters 
District Council v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., pointed out the flaw 
in the Third Circuit’s reading of subsection 2104(a)(2).163  Subsection 
2104(a)(2) allows an employer to deduct from its WARN Act liability 
the wages earned for work performed during the violation period.164  
This provision generally applies to circumstances in which the employer 
has substantially reduced an employee’s hours without giving the 
employee the required sixty days’ notice165 but has not yet terminated 
the employee.166  Because a terminated employee, by definition, will not 
perform services during the violation period, such an employee will not 
receive any wages during the violation period.  Therefore, subsection 
2104(a)(2) will not apply because there will be no “wages paid” for the 
employer to deduct.167  Unless an employer pays statutory damages to a 
 
 159. North Star Steel, 5 F.3d at 42 (quoting Robert T. Winzinger, Inc. v. Mgmt. 
Recruiters, Inc., 841 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
 160. Id. at 42–43. 
 161. Id. at 43. 
 162. See Saxion v. Titan-C-Mfg., Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 559–60 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 163. Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1284 n.14 
(5th Cir. 1994). 
 164. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(2) (2000).  This section provides in part: “The amount for 
which an employer is liable . . . shall be reduced by any wages paid by the employer to the 
employee for the period of the violation . . . .”  Id.; see also Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1284 n.14. 
 165. See 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(6)(C). 
 166. Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1284 n.14.  Subsection 2104(a)(2) would also apply when 
an employer places an employee on a paid leave of absence during the violation period 
or when an employer pays statutory damages in lieu of notice.  See supra Part III.B. 
 167. Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1284 n.14.  In fact, as argued by the defendant in North 
Star Steel Co., the Third Circuit’s own interpretation may produce anomalous results.  
See Saxion, 86 F.3d at 560. 
If each aggrieved employee were entitled to damages in the amount of a normal 
day’s pay multiplied by 60, a hypothetical part-time employee who worked just 
one ten-hour shift each Saturday would recover substantially higher damages 
than a full-time employee, paid at the same hourly rate, who worked eight hours 
per day, five days per week.  Such a result would obviously be absurd. 
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terminated employee during the violation period under the pay-in-lieu-
of-notice approach, the employer will not be allowed a deduction under 
subsection 2104(a)(2) for a terminated employee.168 
Lastly, the Third Circuit determined that interpreting back pay to 
mean lost earnings would render subsection 2104(a)(1) inconsistent with 
other provisions of the WARN Act.169  The Third Circuit reasoned that if 
back pay is interpreted to mean lost earnings, an employer should be 
allowed to offset its WARN Act obligations with any earnings received 
by an employee during the violation period, including wages received from 
a different employer.170  Therefore, because subsection 2104(a)(2)(A) 
only allows a deduction for wages paid by the violating employer, 
subsection 2104(a)(2) is inconsistent with a lost earnings interpretation 
of back pay under subsection 2104(a)(1).171 
Both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have found such reasoning to be 
unpersuasive.172  While it is true that the WARN Act does not include a 
provision that would allow an employer to deduct the wages that its 
employee earns from other employers, the Fifth Circuit persuasively 
provides plausible reasons for the WARN Act’s departure from a purely 
remedial damage award: “the desire to avoid placing a burden on a 
terminated employee to mitigate damages by taking any job offered, the 
desire to give a terminated employee a window of time to readjust 
without immediately having to search for a job, [and] the desire for 
simplicity in the statutory scheme.”173 
Although the Third Circuit’s adoption of a calendar day interpretation 
has found little following,174 it nonetheless remains the current law of 
 
Id. 
 168. Lipsig & Fentonmiller, supra note 48, at 311.  It should be noted that while the 
pay-in-lieu-of-notice approach may be a technical violation of the WARN Act, if proper 
pay is provided, no damages will be owed to the employee because the employee’s 
exclusive remedy would be satisfied by the pay-in-lieu-of-notice payment.  Id.; see also 
supra Part III.B. 
 169. United Steelworkers of America v. North Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Saxion, 86 F.3d at 558–61; Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1284 n.14. 
 173. Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1284 n.14. 
 174. See Johnson v. Telespectrum Worldwide, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 116, 127 (D. 
Del. 1999) (noting that every other circuit to decide the calendar versus working day 
issue has held working days to be the proper measure of damages); infra note 179 and 
accompanying text. 
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the Third Circuit.175  Thus, an employer that has employees in multiple 
states will likely find itself stymied by these differing interpretations 
with no way to comply with all applicable laws.  Take, for example, the 
employer that has employees in Pennsylvania (within the Third Circuit, 
which has adopted the calendar days approach), Ohio (within the Sixth 
Circuit, which has adopted the working days approach), and Indiana 
(within the Seventh Circuit, which has yet to rule on the issue of whether 
the calendar or working days approach should be adopted).  If this 
employer violates the WARN Act by failing to provide proper notice 
and seeks to satisfy its liability through the pay-in-lieu-of-notice 
approach, it will be required to calculate the employees’ pay using a 
separate formula for each state.  The employer will likely use the 
working days method to determine liability to the Indian employees 
because there is no guidance on this point from the Seventh Circuit and 
the working days approach is more favorable to the employer.  Under 
the separate calculations approach, the Pennsylvania employees will 
receive a windfall due to the calendar day calculation, while the Ohio 
and Indiana employees will not receive this windfall under the working 
days calculation.  Although utilizing the separate calculations approach 
affords the employer a good chance of avoiding WARN Act liability, the 
employer subjects itself to potential liability for discrimination claims 
from the Ohio and Indiana employees.  Thus, this hypothetical employer 
faces a Hobson’s choice between liability for its WARN Act violation 
and liability for employee discrimination.176  Problems like this are very 
real.  To avoid imposing such undue economic hardship on employers, a 
change to the WARN Act is necessary. 
2.  A Resolution to the Calendar Days Versus Working Days                
Debate: The Working Days Approach                                                       
Should Be Adopted 
The WARN Act should be amended to reflect that the calculation of 
back pay is based on the number of working days during the violation 
period.  As previously discussed, a statutory amendment is the most 
effective means for resolving the debate because the issue can be wholly 
 
 175. See Johnson, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 127.  The Third Circuit is comprised of 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.  See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000). 
 176. Of course, the employer could take the ultraconservative approach of 
providing the Ohio and Indiana employees with the same windfall provided to the 
Pennsylvania employees by paying Ohio and Indiana employees based on the calendar 
day approach.  However, such an approach would impose an additional financial burden 
on the employer that could be quite substantial, depending on the amount of additional 
back pay required by the calendar day approach. 
CROSS.DOC 1/15/2020  1:37 PM 
[VOL. 40:  711, 2003]  Failure to WARN 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 745 
addressed in the amendment.177  Such an amendment is supported by a 
majority of the circuit courts, legislative history, and long-standing 
principles of statutory interpretation.  As discussed above, in the event of 
an employer violation, the WARN Act provides for a “make-whole” 
remedy for employees, whereby the employer must pay damages equal 
to the money and benefits the employees would have earned had proper 
notice been given.178  To date, six circuits have addressed the issue of 
whether the calculation of back pay is based on the number of calendar 
or on the number of working days.  All of these circuits, with the 
exception of the Third Circuit, have concluded that the calculation is 
based on the number of working days.179  In addition, although the 
Seventh Circuit has not yet ruled on the matter, a district court within the 
Seventh Circuit has adopted the working day calculation approach.180 
Compensating employees only for the number of working days during 
the violation period makes the most sense and is consistent with the 
purpose of the WARN Act.181  If the measure of damages were based on 
the number of calendar days, employees would receive back pay for 
days that they would not have worked had they been given the proper 
notice.  Thus, aggrieved employees would receive a windfall, which 
would put them in a better position than they would have enjoyed absent 
the WARN Act violation.182  If the goal of the WARN Act is to make 
employees whole, a working days approach achieves this end.183  In 
contrast, a calendar day interpretation goes beyond the intent of the Act 
and results in an employee windfall at the expense of the employer.184  
 
 177. See discussion supra Part IV.C (regarding the advantages of a statutory 
resolution over a judicial resolution). 
 178. See Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas 
Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 973 (2001). 
 179. See Joe v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1067, 1072 (8th Cir. 2000); Burns v. 
Stone Forest Indus., Inc., 147 F.3d 1182, 1182–85 (9th Cir. 1998); Saxion v. Titan-C-
Mfg., Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 558–61 (6th Cir. 1996); Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 
771–72 (10th Cir. 1995); Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 
1275, 1282–86 (5th Cir. 1994); United Steelworkers v. North Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39, 
41–44 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 180. Local 1239, Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Allsteel, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 901, 
903, 906 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
 181. See United Mine Workers v. Midwest Coal Co., No. TH 99-C-141-T/H, 2001 
WL 1385893, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 31, 2001). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. The windfall at the employer’s expense has a punitive effect.  Requiring 
employers to pay a windfall to employees upon violation of WARN Act would have 
detrimental corporate economic effects in that it would further damage a company’s 
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In addition, such a result would be directly contrary to congressional 
intent.  The Senate has stated that the WARN Act was not intended as a 
means “to place an additional financial burden on the employers of this 
country.”185  Thus, because the calendar day interpretation would impose 
additional financial burdens on employers by requiring them to pay 
employees for days the employees would not have otherwise worked, 
such an interpretation is inconsistent with the purpose of the WARN Act 
and should be rejected.186  Although the working day approach would 
theoretically allow employees a windfall if they were immediately able 
to secure reemployment with another employer, such a windfall is 
acceptable because the violating employer does not bear its expense and 
it does not frustrate the purpose of the WARN Act.187 
In addition, the calendar day interpretation is inconsistent with the 
concept of back pay and congressional intent to maintain the employee’s 
income stream during the violation period.  As proposed by this 
Comment, back pay consists of any payments the employee would have 
received during the violation period had the employee continued to 
work.  The calendar day approach flies in the face of the concept of back 
pay in that it compensates employees for days that they did not work.188  
It allows damages to employees beyond that which they could have 
reasonably expected to have earned during the violation period.189  
Further, calculating back pay based on the number of calendar days 
rather than on the number of working days arbitrarily causes some 
employees to receive greater damage payments than others.190  For 
example, an employee who works four ten-hour shifts per week would 
receive more back pay than an employee who works five eight-hour 
shifts per week.191  Because both workers normally work forty hours per 
 
bottom line, which is clearly already suffering as evidenced by the need to conduct the 
mass layoff or plant closing.  Pushing a company unnecessarily closer to failure only 
serves to further perpetuate the ripple effect felt by companies and citizens in poor 
economic times. 
 185. Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking Cos., 140 F.3d 797, 801 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(quoting 134 CONG. REC. 15,928 (1988) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum)). 
 186. The additional cost to an employer in paying damages that are based on the 
number of calendar days instead of working days is startling.  Jeffrey J. Turner proposes 
that the additional cost of the calendar day approach is roughly thirty percent.  To take 
the theory out of the abstract and into the present, Turner took the facts of the North Star 
Steel case and applied a hypothetical calculation associated with laying off 270 
employees without proper WARN Act notice.  Under the calendar day approach, the 
employer’s liability was $1,373,760, whereas under the workday approach, the 
employer’s liability was $1,007,424—a $360,000 difference.  Turner, supra note 70, at 200. 
 187. See Turner, supra note 70, at 221. 
 188. See Breedlove, 140 F.3d at 800. 
 189. See Turner, supra note 70, at 218. 
 190. Burns v. Stone Forest Indus., Inc., 147 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 191. Id.  In this example, the employee who worked eight hours a day would 
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week and the only difference between the two workers is the number of 
hours per day that they work, allowing one worker to receive more back 
pay than the other is “arbitrary and serves no useful purpose.”192  
Therefore, the only reasonable interpretation of the back pay provision of 
the WARN Act is that the calculation of back pay is to be based on the 
number of working days that fall within the violation period. 
Obviously both DeShai and its employees have an economic stake in 
the manner in which the calendar versus working days debate is settled: 
they both stand to either gain or lose money.193  DeShai wishes to 
minimize damages owed, while the employees wish to maximize such 
damages.  However, the working days approach best serves the purpose 
of the WARN Act by preventing windfall payments to the employees at 
the employer’s expense and by avoiding any unintended punitive effect 
on the employer.  Amending the WARN Act to clarify that the 
calculation of back pay is to be based on the number of working days 
would further the purpose of the Act and would put employees in the 
same position they would have been absent the employer’s violation.194 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The intent behind the WARN Act is a noble one: to protect the income 
stream of American workers in the event of mass layoffs and plant 
closures by requiring advance notice to affected employees.  However, 
unless employers, such as DeShai, are able to understand their 
obligations and potential liability under the WARN Act, workers will 
not fully realize the protections that the WARN Act seeks to provide.  It 
is imperative that an employer attempting to comply with the WARN 
Act be able to determine with relative certainty the actions that it must 
take to relieve itself of liability under the Act.  Certainty with respect to 
damages is vital because it gives employers incentives to preempt  
damages awards by immediately paying aggrieved employees WARN 
Act damages in order to avoid the assessment of government penalties.  
 
receive 480 hours worth of back pay for a sixty day violation period, whereas the 
employee who worked ten hours a day would receive 600 hours worth of back pay for a 
sixty day violation period.  This difference is true despite the fact that both employees 
work the same forty hours per week.  Id.; Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t 
Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1285 n.16 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 192. United Mine Workers v. Midwest Coal Co., No. TH 99-C-141-T/H, 2001 WL 
1385893, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 31, 2001). 
 193. See Turner, supra note 70, at 200. 
 194. See id. at 218. 
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Unfortunately, the WARN Act’s ambiguity and the splits between the 
circuit courts in interpreting such ambiguities have created a situation in 
which no employer can be assured that its compliance actions are 
sufficient to relieve it of liability.  Without the certainty that the 
preemptive payment of damages will relieve an employer of its liability 
for a WARN Act violation, voluntary payment of damages by employers 
will not be the norm and employees will be forced to fight for their 
entitlements under the WARN Act.  When employees are forced to take 
on their employers, no one wins because the litigation costs are felt by 
the employee, the employer, and society as a whole, in the form of 
increased court costs to process the employee claims. 
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly refused over the last 
decade to resolve the splits between the circuit courts regarding 
interpretation of an employee’s remedy under the Act, Congress has no 
choice but to step in and resolve the problem.  In order to make the 
WARN Act more effective in carrying out its goal, Congress should 
amend the WARN Act in three ways: (1) by designating the remedy 
afforded to employees as a compensatory, make-whole remedy that 
allows the employee to recover damages equal to the pay and benefits 
that the employee would have earned absent the employer’s violation of 
the WARN Act, (2) by including a broad definition of back pay that 
includes all pay and non-ERISA benefits the employee would have 
earned during the violation period and adopting the snapshot test to assist 
employers in determining whether particular compensation or benefits are 
included as back pay, and (3) by declaring that the calculation of back pay 
will be based on the number of working days during the violation period. 
In passing the WARN Act, Congress enacted an ambiguous statute 
that has caused employers unnecessary litigation expense; it is therefore 
up to Congress to endorse the interpretations adopted by the majority of 
circuits by amending the WARN Act.  Until the proposed amendments 
are enacted, all employers, including DeShai, will continue to suffer the 
consequences of the statutory ambiguities of the WARN Act.  These 
consequences will no doubt continue to have serious and detrimental 
impacts on local economies, impacts that will in turn impact the national 
economy, thus leaving no company immune from the effects of the 
WARN Act. 
TONYA M. CROSS 
 
